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The Lulling Effect: The Impact of Child-Resistant 
Packaging on Aspirin and Analgesic Ingestions 
By W. KiP VIscusI* 
In 1972 the Food and Drug Administra- 
tion imposed a protective bottlecap require- 
ment on aspirin and other selected drugs. 
This regulation epitomizes the technological 
approach to social regulation. The strategy 
for reducing children's poisoning risks was to 
design caps that would make opening con- 
tainers of hazardous substances more dif- 
ficult. This engineering approach will be 
effective provided that children's exposure to 
hazardous products does not increase. If, 
however, parents leave protective caps off 
bottles because they are difficult to open, or 
increase children's access to these bottles be- 
cause they are supposedly "child proof," the 
regulation may not have a beneficial effect. 
Indeed, in this case there was no signifi- 
cant impact of the regulation on aspirin poi- 
soning rates, but there has been an alarming, 
upward shift in the trend of analgesic inges- 
tion rates since 1972. The source of this 
pattern appears to be attributable to a gen- 
eral reduction in parental caution with re- 
spect to such medicines, which has had an 
adverse spillover effect on unregulated prod- 
ucts. The economic mechanisms involved can 
be best understood by considering the nature 
of individuals' response to regulatory protec- 
tion. 
1. The Lulling Effect: A Conceptual Analysis 
One can distinguish three different mecha- 
nisms by which protective packaging require- 
ments can lead to actions on the part of 
parents and their children that are at least 
potentially counterproductive. First, regula- 
tions will lead to a reduction in safety-related 
efforts for the affected product. Second, the 
regulation may produce misperceptions that 
lead consumers to reduce their safety precau- 
tions because they overestimate the product's 
safety. Finally, if there are indivisibilities in 
one's actions (for example, choosing whether 
to keep medicines in a bathroom cabinet or 
in the kitchen), regulating one product may 
affect the safety of other products. These 
effects are quite general and are not re- 
stricted to the case of protective bottlecaps. 
The existing theoretical literature on indi- 
vidual responses to regulatory protection be- 
gan with the analysis by Sam Peltzman 
(1975), who showed that seatbelts would lead 
to increased driving intensity (for example, 
less caution or higher speeds). The economic 
mechanism generating this effect is similar to 
that which produces adverse incentives or 
moral hazard problems in the insurance con- 
text. As one reduces either the probability of 
a loss or the size of the loss, individual 
incentives to take precautionary actions will 
be reduced. Regulations function much like 
insurance in this regard, with the only dif- 
ference being that one need not pay an in- 
surance premium. (There may, however, be 
an effect of the regulation on the product 
price.) 
In my 1979 article, I derived a similar 
result for the case of worker safety for quite 
general classes of risk-averse preferences, 
where the safety measures also affected the 
wage rate. Except in the case of very strin- 
gently enforced government regulations, firms 
would not make technological changes in the 
workplace that were counterproductive. 
Compliance with policies such as seatbelt 
and bottlecap requirements is less discretion- 
ary, however, so one cannot rule out counter- 
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productive regulatory effects in these in- 
stances. 
To investigate these effects more formally, 
consider a simple model that captures the 
essential features of these analyses. Let s be 
the stringency of the government policy and 
e be the precautionary effort, where each of 
these reduces the probability p (e, s) of an 
accident at a diminishing rate. Alternatively, 
one can make the mechanism of influence 
the size of the accident loss L, as in Peltz- 
man, but for purposes of this model I will 
make L a constant. The individual's effort e 
generates a disutility V(e), where V', V" > 0. 
Finally, let the person have an income 
level I. 
The payoff in the case of an accident is 
I - V(e)- L, and the payoff if there is not 
an accident is I - V(e). The individual's ex- 
pected utility (assuming risk neutrality) is 
I - V(e)- p(e, s)L. In setting the optimal 
level of e, one equates the marginal reduc- 
tion in the loss PeL to the marginal value of 
the effort - Ve, leading to the optimal point 
A in Figure 1. 
The effect of the regulation on safety effort 
will be negative, or 
de - Pes 0 
ds PeeL + Vee 
provided the Pes > 0 (or Les > 0 in Peltzman's 
loss model). For safety efforts to decline, the 
safety regulation must reduce the marginal 
safety benefits from precautionary efforts, 
that is, the reduction in the expected loss 
from higher levels of effort is less negative 
than before. One will then choose a point to 
the left of point B on the EL1 curve in 
Figure 1. This effect should not be particu- 
larly controversial. Few would question the 
opposite relationship where individuals in- 
crease their precautions when moving from 
EL1 to ELo. For example, one will drive 
more carefully on icy streets and reduce 
cigarette smoking if exposed to synergistic 
asbestos risks. 
What is more problematic is whether the 
reduction in precautions will be so great that 
there will be a reduction in safety to a point 






FIGURE 1. PRECAUTIONARY BEHAVIOR 
AND EXPECTED LOSSES 
for this to occur have never been investigated 
and are quite stringent. It is not sufficient 
that the marginal expected loss reduction at 
point C be no greater than at A. The require- 
ment is stronger since the marginal disutility 
of effort Ve will be lower at lower effort 
levels. To equate the marginal expected loss 
reduction peL to the marginal effort cost 
- V,e the loss curve EL1 must be flatter at 
point C than ELo was at point A. Since there 
is the additional restriction that EL1 lie be- 
low ELo, it will be difficult to meet these 
requirements. 
The chance that the impact of protective 
regulations may be counterproductive may 
be enhanced if individuals either do not per- 
ceive accurately the accident probabilities, or 
do not fully bear the accident costs. If parents 
assume "child-resistant" caps are child proof, 
they may overestimate the safety associated 
with these products. Similarly, since there is 
some evidence that individuals tend to set 
very small probabilities equal to zero, the 
safety-enhancing properties of caps may re- 
duce the risk so much that parents ignore the 
poisoning risk. In each case, safety precau- 
tions will decline, perhaps to so great an 
extent that overall safety is reduced. For 
example, parents may select point D off of 
their perceived loss curve EL2 in a situation 
where the true loss curve is EL1 and the 
actual outcome is point F. 
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A similar effect could occur if parents do 
not fully value the welfare of their children, 
or if drivers do not fully internalize the acci- 
dent costs to pedestrians and other parties. 
Unlike the case of biased probabilistic be- 
liefs, this modification in the problem need 
not entail a shift in the relative values of the 
accident loss in the regulated and unregu- 
lated situations. Thus, the ELo and EL1 
curves may both simply shift proportionally. 
In contrast, misperceptions such as those 
discussed above necessarily lead to a com- 
paratively greater downward shift in the per- 
ceived expected loss, increasing the chance of 
a counterproductive ffect. 
One's precautionary actions may affect the 
safety of unregulated products as well as 
those that are regulated. In the case of child- 
resistant bottlecaps, parents may make over- 
all decisions regarding the storage of medi- 
cines. Should they keep all of the medicines 
in the bathroom cabinet, on a kitchen shelf, 
or in a safety-latched drawer? More gener- 
ally, should they worry about access to 
medicines or undertake only a mild level of 
precautions, since the most hazardous prod- 
ucts are presumably protected by child- 
resistant containers? 
The analytics of this effort decision paral- 
lel that given above, where the only dif- 
ference is that the ELo and EL1 curves are a 
weighted average of the component risks, 
where some products are protected and others 
are not. A joint risk curve EL1 will tend to 
shift downward less in response to a regula- 
tion than a comparable curve for a particular 
regulated product, since the presence of the 
unregulated product will dampen the re- 
sponse. 
There is a clearcut empirical test of whether 
indivisible actions such as this play a role. If 
there are such spillover effects, the reduction 
in safety-enhancing efforts induced by the 
regulation should increase the risk posed by 
the unregulated product. In addition, the 
safety improvement of the regulated product 
will be reduced at least in part by the reduc- 
tion in individual precautions. The net effect 
on safety could be adverse for the regulated 
product or for both products combined, but 
one must satisfy fairly stringent conditions 
for the net effect to be adverse unless misper- 
ceptions of the risk play a major role. 
II. The Effect of Child-Resistant Bottlecaps 
A widely touted product safety regulation 
success story is child-resistant bottlecaps. The 
first caps required under this regulation were 
for aspirin and selected drugs in 1972. Before 
the advent of protective packaging, manufac- 
turers concentrated their efforts on measures 
such as decreasing the number of tablets per 
bottle, warning labels, and educational cam- 
paigns. Here I will summarize some of the 
results from my forthcoming study regarding 
the effectiveness of safety caps, which pro- 
vides very strong evidence regarding the role 
of individual actions that differ in character 
from the seatbelt case (see Glenn Blomquist, 
forthcoming, for a review). 
In 1971 aspirin was responsible for a fatal 
poisoning rate of 2.6 per million children 
under age 5, and by 1980 this rate had 
dropped to 0.6. The overall aspirin poisoning 
rate exhibited a similar drop, from 5.0 to 1.7 
per 1,000. While these declines were dramatic, 
after taking into account the trend in aspirin 
poisonings and the decline in aspirin sales in 
the 1970's, there is no statistically significant 
impact of the regulation. This result was 
obtained using both a regulation dummy 
variable, which assumed a value of 1 in the 
1972-80 period, and a variable that reflected 
the fraction of aspirin sold with safety cap 
bottles. 
This fraction of capped bottles remained 
at just over half of all aspirin sold since firms 
were permitted to market one size of aspirin 
container without a child-resistant cap. Typi- 
cally, firms chose the best selling size (the 
100-tablet bottle). 
Despite the constant sales share of safety 
capped aspirin, there has been a sharp in- 
crease in the proportion of aspirin-related 
poisonings associated with protective pack- 
aging. Whereas 40 percent of all aspirin poi- 
sonings in 1972 were from safety cap bottles, 
this figure rose to 73 percent by 1978. This 
pattern is noteworthy for two reasons. First, 
safety cap bottles are by no means risk free, 
as they account for a majority of the poison- 
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ings and a disproportionate amount com- 
pared to their sales. Almost half of all aspirin 
poisonings are from bottles that had been 
left open. Second, there appears to be an 
alarming increase in the rate of safety cap 
poisonings. While each of these effects may 
be attributable in part to consumers match- 
ing their aspirin bottle-type choice (with or 
without a cap) to whether or not they have 
young children, another factor may be that 
there is an increased degree of irresponsibil- 
ity regarding medicines. 
Such irresponsibility is consistent with evi- 
dence of an apparent spillover effect on pre- 
viously unregulated analgesics, which include 
acetaminophen preparations uch as Tylenol. 
Analgesic poisoning rates for children under 
age 5 escalated from 1.1 per 1,000 in 1971 to 
1.5 per 1,000 in 1980. Even after taking into 
account increases in analgesic sales, 47 per- 
cent of this increase is attributable to an 
unexplained upward shift in the analgesic 
poisoning rate beginning in 1972. The cou- 
pling of the absence of any shift in the trend 
of aspirin poisoning rates with an upsurge in 
analgesic poisoning rates is consistent with 
the hypothesis that there is a significant indi- 
visibility in safety precautions. Moreover, 
absence of a significant effect of safety caps 
on aspirin poisonings and the 47 percent 
unexplained shift in analgesic poisonings 
suggests that the impact of the regulation on 
balance was counterproductive, leading to 
3,500 additional poisonings of children un- 
der age 5 annually from analgesics. 
It is possible but unlikely that such a 
strong impact could emerge from fully ra- 
tional consumer decisions. Moreover, this 
effect is not only large but reasonably 
widespread, as I have identified a similar 
pattern for prescription drugs, and for clean- 
ing and polishing agents. A more likely ex- 
planation for these dramatic effects is that 
consumers have been lulled into a less- 
safety-conscious mode of behavior by the 
existence of safety caps. The presumed 
effectiveness of the technological solution 
may have induced increased parental irre- 
sponsibility. 
A variety of regulatory efforts have sought 
to reduce individual risks through mandated 
technological changes. These measures will 
be effective if individual actions remain 
unchanged. In practice, these regulations will 
produce a lulling effect on consumer behav- 
ior because the perceived need for precau- 
tions will decline, potentially producing ad- 
verse spillover effects on the safety of other 
products. The strength of these impacts 
should highlight the importance of taking 
individual behavior into account when de- 
signing regulations intended to promote 
safety. 
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